

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-19

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S E C R E T VIENNA 9565

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: UK PRESENTATION ON DATA

ATTACHED IS THE UK PRESENTATION ON DATA, AS APPROVED BY
THE AHG FOR DELIVERY AT THE NOV 20 PLENARY.

BEGIN TEXT:

1. IN MY STATEMENT OF 8 NOVEMBER, MR. CHAIRMAN, I OUTLINED THE
THINKING OF MY COLLEAGUES AND MYSELF ON THE PROBLEM OF DISPARITIES.
I DESCRIBED IN GENERAL TERMS THE NUMERICAL DISPARITIES BETWEEN
WESTERN AND EASTERN GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. I
EXPLAINED HOW OUR CONCERN ABOUT THE NUMERICAL DISPARITIES WAS
COMPOUNDED BY THE FACTS OF GEOGRAPHY WHICH ALSO RESULT IN
DISPARITIES FAVOURING THE EAST. I EXPLAINED WHY,
IN OUR VIEW, THIS PROBLEM IS CENTRAL TO THE NEGOTIATIONS ON WHICH
WE ARE EMBARKED.

2. TODAY I SHOULD LIKE TO LOOK IN GREATER DETAIL AT THE
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NUMERICAL DISPARITIES, TO SHOW THEIR RELEVANCE TO OUR GENERAL

PROPOSALS ON HOW TO DEAL WITH THESE DISPARITIES, AND TO GIVE YOU THE MAIN FIGURES ON WHICH OUR CASE RESTS. THESE FIGURES CONSTITUTE THE MOST READILY COMPREHENSIBLE YARDSTICK BY WHICH TO MEASURE THE MILITARY POTENTIAL OF EITHER SIDE. IN THE LIGHT OF THESE FIGURES IT WILL BE APPARENT JUST HOW GREAT THE QUANTITATIVE DISPARITIES ARE; AND WHY, AS MY COLLEAGUES AND I BELIEVE, ANY REDUCTIONS WHICH SIMPLY PRESERVED THESE NUMERICAL DISPARITIES AT A LOWER LEVEL OF FORCES WOULD FAIL TO MEET OUR AGREED OBJECTIVES OF CREATING A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP.

3. I SHOULD EMPHASIZE THAT THE FIGURES I AM ABOUT TO PRESENT RELATE TO FORCES IN BELGIUM, CZECHOSLOVAKIA, THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC, THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY, LUXEMBOURG, THE NETHERLANDS AND POLAND. THE PRESENT FIGURES DO NOT INCLUDE SOVIET OR NATIONAL FORCES IN HUNGARY. THE QUESTION OF HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT HUNGARY WILL BE INCLUDED IN FUTURE DECISIONS, AGREEMENTS OR MEASURES REMAINS TO BE EXAMINED AND DECIDED.

4. I PROPOSE TO DEAL FIRST WITH THE FIGURE FOR GROUND FORCE MANPOWER BECAUSE, FOR THE REASONS GIVEN BY MY GERMAN COLLEAGUE ON 13 NOVEMBER, WE PROPOSE THAT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD FOCUS ON GROUND FORCES AND THEIR COMBAT CAPABILITY. WESTERN GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE ARE STRUCTURED, DEPLOYED, AND EQUIPPED FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE WEST. THEIR SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS DEMONSTRATE THIS DEFENSIVE ORIENTATION. THE GROUND FORCES OF THE EAST IN CENTRAL EUROPE CONSIDERABLY OUTNUMBER THOSE OF THE WEST. THE LARGE NUMBER OF THESE FORCES MAINTAINED IN CENTRAL EUROPE BY THE EAST, (OF WHICH THE FORCES OF THE SOVIET UNION COMPRISE HALF), APPEARS, TO WESTERN EYES, MORE THAN WOULD BE REQUIRED FOR AN ADEQUATE DEFENSE.

5. THE TOTAL FIGURE FOR THE GROUND FORCE MANPOWER OF ALL MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE IN THE AREA ALREADY REFERRED TO IS 777,000. THE COMPARABLE FIGURE FOR THE GROUND FORCE MANPOWER OF MEMBER COUNTRIES OF THE WARSAW PACT IN THE SAME AREA IS 925,000. WARSAW PACT GROUND FORCES IN THE AREA EXCEED NATO GROUND FORCES BY ABOUT 20 PERCENT, OR 150,000 MEN. THIS IS BY ANY STANDARDS A SUBSTANTIAL DISPARITY. IT IS ONE WHICH, IF WE ARE TO FULFIL THE

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AGREED PURPOSE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS, SHOULD BE ELIMINATED. THE METHOD BY WHICH WE PROPOSE THAT THIS SHOULD BE DONE WAS OUTLINED BY MY GERMANY COLLEAGUE ON 13 NOVEMBER, NAMELY THE ESTABLISHMENT OF APPROXIMATE PARITY IN THE FORM OF A COMMON CEILING FOR GROUND FORCE MANPOWER.

6. AS MY AMERICAN COLLEAGUE POINTED OUT IN HIS STATEMENT ON 13 NOVEMBER, WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE PRUDENT TO APPROACH THE

ULTIMATE GOAL OF A COMMON CEILING IN TWO PHASES. HE PROPOSED THAT THE FIRST PHASE SHOULD CONSIST OF REDUCTIONS OF UNITED STATES AND SOVIET GROUND FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES AND SOVIET UNION, OWING TO THEIR LARGE MILITARY RESOURCES, BEAR A SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY FOR MAINTAINING WORLD PEACE AND FOR FACILITATING THE RELAXATION OF TENSION. THE TOTAL NUMBER OF UNITED STATES GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE AREA IS 193,000. THE TOTAL FOR SOVIET GROUND FORCE MANPOWER IN THE SAME AREA IS 460,000, OR WELL OVER A QUARTER OF A MILLION MORE SOLDIERS IN THE AREA THAN THE UNITED STATES.

7. THE DISPARITY BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES IN MAIN BATTLE TANKS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, AS SEVERAL OF MY COLLEAGUES AND I HAVE POINTED OUT, IS A SOURCE OF PARTICULAR CONCERN TO THE WESTERN SIDE IN THESE NEGOTIATIONS. THE COUNTRIES OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC ALLIANCE HAVE 6,000 MAIN BATTLE TANKS IN ACTIVE UNITS IN THE COUNTRIES I HAVE LISTED IN CENTRAL EUROPE AS AGAINST A WARSAW PACT TOTAL OF 15,500 IN ACTIVE UNITS IN THE SAME COUNTRIES. IN OTHER WORDS, THE TANK RATIO IN THE AREA IS 2.5:1 IN FAVOUR OF THE WARSAW PACT. THIS REPRESENTS AN OBJECTIVE MILITARY FACTOR WHICH WE CANNOT IGNORE. A SUBSTANTIAL REDUCTION OF WARSAW PACT TANKS IN CENTRAL EUROPE WOULD, IN OUR VIEW, CONSTITUTE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO ENHANCED STABILITY IN EUROPE, AND WOULD STILL LEAVE ENOUGH TANKS FOR THE NEEDS OF DEFENSE.

8. THESE DISPARITIES ARE OF AN ORDER WHICH MAKES IT, IN OUR VIEW, UNREALISTIC TO SUGGEST THAT STABILITY COULD BE INCREASED BY AN AGREEMENT OR AGREEMENTS WHICH SIMPLY PRESERVED THEM UNCHANGED AT A LOWER LEVEL OF FORCES. THIS WOULD MEAN THAT MUCH REDUCED WESTERN FORCES WOULD BE MORE THINLY SPREAD. THEY WOULD STILL HAVE TO DEFEND THE SAME GEOGRAPHICAL AREA AND ALSO ALONG A BORDER STRETCHING

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FROM THE BALTIC SEA TO THE FRONTIER OF AUSTRIA. THEY WOULD HAVE TO FACE FORCES ON THE OTHER SIDE WHICH WOULD NEVERTHELESS RETAIN, BY THE SAME MARGIN AS BEFORE, A SIGNIFICANT SUPERIORITY IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AS WELL AS AN EVEN GREATER SUPERIORITY IN TANKS.

9. THE FIGURES I HAVE GIVEN FOR WARSAW PACT FORCES ARE THE RESULT OF CAREFUL ANALYSIS. THEY SHOW THE REASONS FOR THE CONCERN ABOUT DISPARITIES MY COLLEAGUES AND I HAVE EXPRESSED IN OUR EARLIER STATEMENTS OVER THE PAST TWO WEEKS AND FOR THE MORE DETAILED PROPOSALS WHICH WE SHALL BE PRESENTING SHORTLY.

END TEXT. HUMES

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